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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City, 
University of London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue focussed 
leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other key 
market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into the 
world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from financing 
to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview
une 2017’s announcement that Amazon 
was buying Whole Foods shook the 
market, sending the shares of 
traditional ‘bricks and mortar’ food retailers 
into freefall. This wasn’t a deal for short-term 
cost saving synergies. Indeed there wasn’t 
even a glossy PowerPoint for analysts to pore 
over and it wasn’t really about a short-term 
boost to top line growth, given Amazon’s own 
stellar performance. It was about innovation 
and long-term positioning. 
Unlike a number of pieces produced by the 
MARC, this report does not focus on the 
short-term economic benefits of M&A but on 
the post-M&A innovative performance of 
companies which might have long-term 
strategic consequences and hopefully 
eventually lead to increased economic 
performance. 
Using an global sample of 1,013 transactions 
with announcement dates between 2000 and 
2015, this report researches the relationship 
between M&A and innovation performance of 
companies active in the information 
technology industry for up to three post-M&A 
years. 
The acquirer's innovation performance is 
analysed by studying the impact of M&A on 
R&D-intensity. The main focus is on the deal-
specific characteristics in terms of industry 
relatedness. 
The research approach is based on the idea 
that R&D is a source for the creation of 
intangible intellectual capital that will create 
positive cash flows in the future. Therefore, it 
focuses only on the effects of innovation 
inputs, measured by R&D-intensity. 
The three questions we attempted to 
address, and their answers: 
1. Will industry relatedness be curvilinearly 
(inverse U-shaped) related to the post-
M&A innovative activities of the 
acquiring firm? 
Answer: Yes (Like Goldilocks. Best to be 
not too related, not too distantly related, 
just the right level of closeness) 
 
2. Is there is a positive relationship 
between the acquirer’s prior activity 
(experience) in industry related M&A 
and the post-M&A innovative activities 
(measured by a higher percentage 
change in R&D intensity) of the 
acquiring firm? 
 
Answer: No 
 
3. Is there is a negative relationship 
between the acquirer’s leverage level at 
the time of acquisition and R&D-intensity 
post the deal? 
 
Answer: Yes 
 
So, there is a ‘sweet spot’, that one might 
call ‘adjacent M&A’. Acquire in an area where 
you know something about the risks and 
threats but where you don’t yet have all the 
answers. 
In rapidly changing areas, newly acquired 
knowledge has a limited shelf life in terms 
of setting you up for the next deal. As MARC 
has written in other reports, M&A needs to be 
part of a sequence of linked events and each 
deal not viewed in isolation. 
Get your house in order first. If you are to 
take advantage of the technological 
opportunities granted by the acquisition, it’s 
going to cost money to leverage them. If you 
are already heavily indebted you may end up 
not being able to spend that money.  
Note that the research in this field is far from 
exhaustive. It isn’t realistically possible yet to 
perform an assessment of other types of 
innovative activity, such as software 
development or internal human resources 
development, since this knowledge is rarely 
codified in R&D expenditure. So we hope this 
research is a step forward, but there are 
many areas still to probe. 
J 
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Background (and a short maths lesson)
he motives for engaging in M&A have 
changed dramatically over the years and 
the period post-2000 is no exception. 
Whereas previously M&A motivation was 
dominated by drivers such as market-entry, 
market domination or simply the desire of a 
company to expand its product base, the last 
wave of mergers has seen the emergence of 
the Internet and rapid technological change. 
These factors, combined, with increased 
competition worldwide, have led to a much 
greater emphasis on exploring external market 
opportunities beyond the firm's boundaries. 
So, given the increasing importance of 
innovation for company growth, and indeed 
survival, does M&A boost innovation or hinder 
it? And what types of M&A will send you down 
the boost path or the hinder path? But first 
there is a fundamental problem to tackle. 
How do you measure innovation? 
In the literature, R&D expenditure and R&D-
intensity (R&D/sales) are two of the key 
indicators used to capture innovative 
performance, especially in R&D-intensive 
industries. They serve as an indicator of the 
firm’s research capabilities and efforts, in terms 
of generating new ideas and new models, that 
might eventually lead to new patents or new 
product announcements. Aside from this, R&D 
inputs are also found to have an influence on 
the broader business of companies, and 
therefore on their future innovative 
performance, particularly in high-tech industries 
1,2. Previously successful R&D expenditure is 
likely to increase the commitment to investing in 
R&D projects in the future. Therefore, the actual 
R&D expenditure reflects not only the current 
input but also a firm’s previous successes. 
Other measures of innovative performance that 
have been used heavily in previous research 
                                                          
1 Hagedoorn, J., Duysters, G. Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management, 2002 
2 Henderson, R., Cockburn, I. Journal of Economics, 1996 
3 Griliches, Z. Journal of Economic Literature, 1990 
4 Pakes, A. and Griliches, Z. Economics Letters,1980 
are measures of R&D output: patent counts, 
patent citations and new product 
announcements. Although actually dominant in 
the literature, the disadvantages and limitations 
of patent statistics as an overall measure of 
innovative performance are well known 3 . To 
start with, patents are not able to measure all 
produced knowledge within the industry since 
some research outputs such as human 
knowledge are not patentable and some are 
kept as industrial secrets. Moreover, their 
impact on the productivity of further 
technological innovations is not the best 
measure to capture the long-term innovative 
capabilities of companies. However, most 
researchers still use them since patent counts 
are easily accessible and remain one of the 
better quantitative measures of performance. 
The relationship between R&D and patents has 
been studied extensively in the past 30 years 
and researchers came to a general conclusion 
that there is a direct relation between R&D input 
and technological output. In their seminal 
studies, Pakes and Griliches mention a high 
correlation between R&D expenditure and the 
number of patents across industries4. 
In 2002, Cloodt and Hagedoorn got together to 
find the definitive answer as to whether using 
multiple indicators to measure innovative 
performance is advantageous 5 . Their study, 
which covers a large sample of nearly 1200 
companies in four high-tech industries, reports 
that there is a strong relationship between the 
indicators of innovative performance. They 
suggest that especially in the information 
technology industry, with sub-sectors such as 
computers, electronics and communications, 
the statistical overlap between R&D inputs and 
patents is so strong that future research might 
consider using any of these indicators to 
5 Hagedoorn, J., Duysters, G. Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management, 2002 
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capture the innovative performance of 
companies. 
Curvilinear 
In this report you will see the word ‘curvilinear’ 
a lot. This refers to a situation where, when we 
are talking about the relationship between two 
variables, the data points increase together up 
to a certain point (like a positive relationship) 
and then as one increases, the other decreases 
(negative relationship) or vice versa. On a 
scatterplot, this develops an arch in which the 
data increase together up to a peak (or a U-
shape). In other words, there is a ’sweet spot’ 
that maximises (or minimises the result). In this 
report we are trying to find properties of an M&A 
programme that maximise changes in R&D 
intensity. 
A classic (non-finance) example would be the 
usage of a drug. A certain amount of the drug 
must be used to gain any kind of positive 
response. But there is a point beyond which the 
use of the drug becomes harmful. 
 
The link to M&A 
According to the theory of industrial 
organisation, acquirers, by becoming larger, 
can benefit from R&D-related economies of 
scale6. M&A, by reducing running costs, can 
increase the overall R&D budgets of the 
merging companies which, in turn, enable them 
to carry out multiple R&D projects 
simultaneously and operate more efficiently. 
Merged companies can also benefit from 
economies of scope by the reduction of the 
                                                          
6 Desyllas, P. and Hughes, A. Research Policy, 2010 
7 Seth, A. Strategic Management Journal, 1990 
duplication of efforts and costs, primarily 
because of the joint production capabilities and 
the consolidation of R&D projects, which are 
now done in the same ‘house’. 
M&A theory suggests that synergy is a crucial 
element for successful value creation. 
Synergetic effects can be found primarily within 
the following five areas: economies of scale, 
economies of scope, diversification, market 
power and coinsurance7. Economies of scope 
and scale are usually associated with related 
industry mergers 8 , while diversification and 
coinsurance are connected to unrelated 
mergers. Therefore, there are different benefits 
acquirers can gain from M&A with respect to the 
level of relatedness. Figure 2 illustrates the 
different potential effects of relatedness and the 
inverted U-shaped innovative performance 
outcomes that result when we sum the synergy 
benefit with the novelty benefit. 
Figure 2: Innovation vs. relatedness relationship 
Source: Cass Business School 
 
On the one hand, a high level of industry-
relatedness between M&A partners will make it 
easier to transfer knowledge because of easier 
communication and learning between 
employees. And ‘traditional’ cost saving 
opportunities will abound. As this distance 
increases, companies need to invest more 
effort and time in the integration process, 
because of a lack of shared common routines 
and harder knowledge transfer. Hence, as 
companies tend to focus on the integration and 
8 Harrison, J.S., Hitt, M.A., Hoskisson, R.E. & Ireland, R.D. 
Journal of Management, 1991 
Combined Impact 
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not on the R&D activity, the impact on post-
M&A innovation can become negative9. 
On the other hand, acquisition of a target with 
too closely related product/market resources 
will leave a company with little new input that 
can stimulate new learnings and hence, 
innovation. Through acquisitions, acquirers 
gain access to new products, ideas and 
practices that in turn enable them to increase 
their own innovative capabilities in the longer 
term. By acquiring firms in different industry 
domains, acquirers become aware of new 
market opportunities which facilitate 
opportunities for expansion. This is in addition 
to the financial benefits such as lower 
bankruptcy risk and the lower cost of capital that 
results from diversification. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Hitt, M.A., Hoskisson, R.E., Johnson, R.A., Moesel, D.D. 
Academy of Management Journal, 1996 
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Previous studies 
he first wave of studies on this topic 
focused only on the direct impact of M&A 
on innovative performance, without 
taking into account the conditions under which 
M&A might affect this performance. Studies 
measuring the direct impact of M&A on the 
acquirers’ R&D input (which is measured by 
R&D expenditure and R&D-intensity) report 
either a neutral effect or a negative impact. 
Similarly, studies that focused on the M&A 
impact on the acquirers’ R&D output (measured 
by patent intensity and new products) also 
report a neutral effect or a negative effect10.  
The second type of study around M&A and 
innovation are more recent studies that focus 
on the deal-specific characteristics of the 
acquirer and the target, such as their market 
relatedness or technological similarities in 
terms of their knowledge assets11. Having taken 
these factors into consideration, results from 
these studies offer a more positive outlook on 
post-M&A innovation performance. 
Since acquisitions in R&D-intensive industries 
are more likely to be technology motivated, the 
existing literature on post-M&A innovative 
performance has largely emphasised the 
technological relatedness between merging 
companies and the complementarity of their 
technology assets12. However, recent research 
has indicated that acquisitions also offer 
opportunities for market-related innovation 13 . 
Acquisitions are not only a means for accessing 
new technological knowledge but companies 
can also gain access to industry-specific 
resources, such as customer demand or market 
trend information. Despite these positive 
theoretical predictions, it was found that market 
relatedness has a negative impact on the R&D 
process when the merging firms are rivals 
(competing in the same industry).  
Therefore, in light of these sometimes-
contradictory results, we believe there is a need 
for further research on the impact of 
product/market relatedness on post-M&A 
innovation.  
Financial capacity 
Further recent research has emphasised the 
impact of acquirers’ financial characteristics as 
a key determinant of innovation input, over and 
above other factors that motivate acquisitions14. 
According to these studies, the ability of the 
acquirer to exploit opportunities from M&A 
might be influenced more by the leverage level 
and leverage growth that an acquirer 
experiences at the time of acquisition than by 
the deal-specific characteristics of the acquirer 
and the target. The theoretical explanation 
behind this is that the high levels of leverage 
force firms to put aside a significant amount of 
cash for debt repayments and therefore 
companies end up having less capital to fund 
necessary post-M&A R&D investments. 
Moreover, companies that experience high 
leverage levels have to deal with tighter 
financial constraints, imposed by investors who 
persuade executives to avoid risky investments 
in long-term projects (i.e., R&D) in the post-
M&A period. 
So, alongside our ‘relatedness’ work we also 
consider the financial capacity issue.
  
                                                          
10 Hitt, M., Ireland, R, Harrison, J. and Hoskisson, R. Academy of 
Management Journal, 1991 
11 Ornaghi, C. International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 
2009 
12 Makri, M., Hitt, M.A. and Lane, P.J. Strategic Management 
Journal, 2010 
13 Fabrizio, K.R. & Thomas, L.G. Strategic Management Journal, 
2012 
14 Vyas, V., Narayanan, K. and Ramanathan, A. Innovation and 
Development, 2013 
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Our approach 
herefore, based on the discussion 
above, we theorise that while some level 
of relatedness between the acquirer and 
the target is seen as advantageous for 
post-M&A integration and performance, but too 
much overlap might limit the benefits of an 
extended and renewed resource base. The 
study hypothesises that acquiring a target with 
a moderate level of industry relatedness will 
lead to better post-M&A innovative 
performance than will acquiring too unrelated or 
too similar a target. A target with a moderate 
level of industry relatedness will provide new 
market and product inputs for post-M&A 
innovation while not incurring a significant net 
cost related to the integration. So our first 
investigation was centred around the following 
question: 
Question One: Will industry relatedness be 
curvilinearly (inverse U-shaped) related to the 
post-M&A innovative activities (measured by a 
percentage change in R&D intensity) of the 
acquiring firm? 
The second question relates to the impact of 
experience in related industry M&A. 
Question Two: Is there is a positive  
relationship between the acquirer’s prior activity 
(experience) in industry related M&A and the 
post-M&A innovative activities (measured by 
the percentage change in R&D intensity) of the 
acquiring firm? 
And finally, we tackle the financing issue. 
Question Three: Is there is a negative 
relationship between the acquirer’s leverage 
level at the time of acquisition and R&D-
intensity post the deal? 
Our dataset 
The questions were addressed over a large 
global sample of publicly-traded companies 
during the period from 1 January 2000 to 31 
December 2015. The sample encompassed 
1,013 deals.  
Besides the need for an updated investigation, 
this period is chosen as it presents an 
interesting time to research because it includes 
periods of fundamental change in the overall 
M&A environment, including the highs and lows 
of the market i.e. the collapse of the information 
technology bubble, the M&A boom of 2006-
2007, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the 
subsequent more recent merger wave. 
 
T 
Figure 3. Yearly distribution and average transaction value of M&A deals in the sample 
Source: Cass Business School 
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The sample includes high technology firms 
which have their primary activity in:  
- Industrial and Commercial Machinery and 
Computer Equipment (SIC code 35), 
- Electronic and other Electrical Equipment 
and Components (SIC code 36), and 
- Computer Programming, Data Processing 
and other Computer Related Services (SIC 
code 737).  
This context was selected as the primary group 
for the analysis for the following reasons. First, 
for firms in these high-tech industries, 
acquisitions are an important means of strategy 
development and implementation, so they 
generally heavily engage in M&A activity 15 . 
Second, these industries are characterised by 
uncertainty, caused by rapid technological 
change and the dependence on technological 
developments. Third, companies operating in 
these industries are facing heavy levels of 
technological competition so there is a pressure 
to innovate. In such an R&D-intensive 
environment, innovation activities and 
outcomes are expected to be key performance 
indicators. Therefore, these high-tech 
industries provide an ideal context for 
examining post-M&A innovation performance. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Deal distribution by primary industry SIC codes 
Source: Cass Business School
                                                          
15 Cloodt, M., Hagedoorn, J., Van Kranenburg, H, Research 
Policy, 2006 
Our methodology 
This study measures innovative performance 
using the percentage change in R&D-intensity. 
R&D-intensity is defined as the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total sales. The percentage 
change of R&D-intensity is calculated and the 
average R&D-intensity for the periods one year 
prior to the deal and up to three years following 
the deal. A review of the literature indicates that 
scholars studying the M&A effect on R&D-
intensity employ a minimum of one-year period 
and a maximum of three year periods16. Post-
M&A three year analysis is useful as it allows 
time for firms to integrate targets effectively. 
Experience in industry-related M&A is 
measured by the number of industry-related 
M&A transactions made during the five-year 
period before the acquisition. As is standard, 
industry-related deals were identified using the 
first three digits (i.e., the first three digits must 
be identical to be classified as related M&A) of 
the unique Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code for each acquisition. However, this 
study also takes into account ‘level of 
relatedness’ by analysing the relationship 
between target and acquirer in M&A deals at 
both the 2-digit and 4-digit level. We describe 2-
digit matched SIC codes as ‘loosely related’, 3 
-digit matched as ‘moderately related’, and 4 
digit-matched as ‘highly related’. 
Leverage level is defined as the ratio of the total 
debt of the firms to the total assets one year 
prior to the consolidation.  
16 Desyllas, P. and Hughes, A. Research Policy, 2010 
Industry SIC 
code 
# of Deals % of Total 
Total Deal 
Value ($mil) 
Average Deal 
Value ($mil) 
Median Deal 
Value ($mil) 
737 562 55.48% $381,161.59 $678.22 $94.32 
36 353 34.85% $362,593.85 $1,030.10 $216.96 
35 98 9.67% $136,444.02 $1,392.29 $409.39 
Total 1013 100.00% $880,199.46 $3,100.61 $720.66 
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Our findings 
he table on the following page shows the 
relevant findings from our analysis. As 
well as analysis to answer our three 
questions, a number of other variables were 
tested in a full multiple regression analysis, 
without providing outcomes that influenced our 
conclusions. For a full discussion of the 
outcomes please see the Appendix. 
Analysis suggests that here is some evidence 
that the acquirer’s activity in loosely-related 
M&A one year prior to the M&A event has a 
negative impact on post-M&A innovative 
activities two and three years after the 
acquisition. However, this impact is rather 
small.  
On the other hand, acquisition of moderately 
related targets one year prior to the M&A 
event results in significant and positive 
correlation with post-M&A innovative activities 
two and three years after the acquisition. There 
is even evidence that this positive correlation 
gradually increases, given that a one-unit 
increase in activity in related deals one year 
prior to the M&A event leads to a 9.9% increase 
in R&D-intensity in the second year, and 13.6% 
increase in the third year.  
 However, if the acquirer’s activity is too related 
(4-digit SIC code relatedness), then M&A one 
year prior to the event is negatively correlated 
to the post-M&A innovative activities in all years 
after the acquisition. The results from 
regression suggest that a unit increase in overly 
related acquisitions one year prior to the M&A 
event leads to a 9.7% decrease in the second 
year, and even to a 15.0% decrease in the third 
year.  
 
These findings give strong support for an 
affirmative answer to Question 1, suggesting a 
curvilinear pattern, as they suggest that to 
increase innovative activities through M&A, 
companies have to target firms which are 
moderately related, avoiding targets that are 
either too unrelated or too related. The 
explanation for this might be that in the latter 
situations the acquirer has to spend heavily on 
restructuring, without any relevant enrichments 
of its existing knowledge base. 
The data does not, however, offer strong 
enough evidence to be able to answer yes to 
Question 2, which asked if there was a positive 
relationship between the acquirer’s prior activity 
in industry related M&A and the post-M&A 
innovative activities of the acquiring firm.  
No significant correlation between serial activity 
in any year before t-1 and R&D-intensity in the 
post-M&A period was found. This might be 
attributed to fast knowledge depreciation and 
the environmental turbulence that characterise 
the IT industry. In high-tech industries, the value 
of knowledge tends to depreciate faster 
because of the rapid rates of replacement and 
obsolescence.  
In the case of previous M&A experience, one 
study observed that more frequent acquirers 
perform better than the less frequent in a long-
term period of 10-13 years17. This implies that 
it takes some time for serial acquirers to 
accumulate their acquisition experience and 
that there is a chance that they would have 
performed better than the less active ones if 
we analysed them for a longer period, or 
indeed in a non ‘tech’ universe sample.
  
                                                          
17 Laamanen, T. and Keil, T. Strategic Management Journal, 
2008 
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Figure 5: Change in R&D intensity (and statistical significance) between one year prior to the deal and in the following three 
periods 
Source: Cass Business School 
 
Acquirer’s Financial Capacity and 
R&D-intensity 
Focusing on the impact of acquirers’ financial 
characteristics on the percentage change in 
R&D-intensity, a statistically significant 
negative relationship between acquirer’s 
leverage level and post-M&A R&D-intensity is 
confirmed for the second and third years 
following the deal and for the average of three 
post-acquisition years, as can be seen in the 
above table. This can be attributable to cash 
flows being used for debt repayments instead 
of investing in new R&D projects. The results 
from regression show that a unit increase in 
leverage level at the time of acquisition leads to 
approximately a 1% decrease in R&D-intensity 
for the different periods. Although the total 
impact is rather small, these findings provide 
strong support to be able to answer yes to 
Question 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Time from Acquisitions (years)   
1 year 2 years 3 years Average over 
3 years 
M&A Experience 2 digit related SIC (t-1) Positive 
very weak 
Negative 
very weak 
Negative 
very weak 
Negative 
very weak 
M&A Experience 3 digit related SIC (t-1) Positive 
very weak 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive 
moderate 
Positive 
moderate 
M&A Experience 4 digit related SIC (t-1) Negative 
weak 
Negative 
strong 
Negative 
strong 
Negative 
very weak 
Leverage N/A Negative 
moderate 
Negative 
strong 
Negative 
strong 
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Conclusions and implications
his report focuses on is whether 
industry relatedness between 
companies engaged in M&A has a 
significant impact on the innovation 
performance of acquirers. It also examines the 
role of acquirer’s characteristics in terms of 
financial capacity and previous M&A 
experience in order to find whether some 
acquirers will perform better than others in this 
context. Analysis of the full dataset from an 
international high-tech environment from 2000 
to 2015 suggests both positive and negative 
effects of acquisitions.  
The results suggest that acquisition of loosely-
related targets results in a slight negative 
impact on R&D-intensity but a significant 
positive relationship if companies are 
moderately related. This finding implies that 
relatedness promotes technological 
complementarities and closeness of ideas 
which lead to enhanced R&D investments. 
However, as the degree of relatedness 
increases, the impact on R&D-intensity 
becomes gradually negative. Therefore, it is 
beneficial to the acquirer to obtain knowledge in 
areas that are somewhat related to its existing 
activities, but neither too related nor too 
unrelated. This finding adds additional support 
to much of the previous empirical evidence as it 
confirms a positive curvilinear relationship 
between industry relatedness and post-M&A 
innovation performance. 
In the case of related acquisitions, the results 
suggest that acquisition brings no significant 
impact on R&D-intensity in the first post-
acquisition year but significantly positive impact 
in the years after. Therefore, integration of 
common but not too similar ideas and 
resources between two companies takes time 
and might only be visible over time.  
Interestingly, there is no clear evidence of a 
positive link between the experience of 
companies in related M&A in the past and R&D 
activity. A high number of M&A transactions in 
the five years prior to the deal do not seem to 
improve the innovative performance of 
companies. These findings indicate that it is not 
possible to observe much just from the quantity 
of previous M&A deals as there are other more 
significant factors that need to be taken into 
account that overwhelm the 
learning/experience factor. What this finding 
does indicate is that, if there is an experience 
effect regarding M&A, the effect probably wears 
off after some time especially in highly turbulent 
industries characterised with fast knowledge 
depreciation such as IT. Further research 
could, look at the quality of experience in terms 
of the effective learning of acquirers, over and 
above the total number of acquisitions in the 
past. 
Regarding the role of an acquirer’s financial 
capacity, results confirm that high leverage 
levels impact negatively the post-deal R&D-
intensity of the acquirer. High leverage levels 
inhibit acquiring firms from investing cash flows 
in R&D projects in the post-M&A period as they 
need to provide funds for, amongst other things, 
debt repayments. 
Recommendations and implications: 
Note that the analysis above was carried out in 
the tech sphere but there is likely a high degree 
of read across to all industries where disruption 
is both the greatest threat and the greatest 
opportunity. Therefore we conclude: 
1. There is a ‘sweet spot’, that one might call 
‘adjacent M&A’. Acquire in an area where you 
know something about the risks and threats 
but where you don’t have all the answers. 
2. In rapidly changing areas, newly acquired 
knowledge has a limited shelf life in terms of 
setting you up for the next deal. As MARC has 
said in other reports, M&A needs to be part of 
a sequence of linked events and each deal not 
viewed in isolation. 
3. Get your house in order first. If you are to take 
advantage of the technological opportunities 
granted by the acquisition you will need to 
spend to leverage them. If you are already 
heavily indebted you may end up not being 
able to spend that money
T 
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Appendix 
To gather the merger data, this study uses Thomson One Banker’s Database for M&A transactions. 
The initial acquisition announcement must occur between 1 January 1995 and 31 December 2015. 
The annual R&D expenditure data and financial information are downloaded from DataStream. In 
total, 26,449 M&A events from high-tech industries were identified. However, it is further imposed that 
all deals are required to satisfy the following conditions to be included in the final sample:  
Figure 6: Condition requirements for study 
Source: Thomson One Banker 
 
Conditions Number of 
deals 
The acquirer is a publicly listed firm  17,458 
The transaction is completed 12,934 
The disclosed transaction value is greater than $10 million 5,178 
SIC codes and Datastream codes of both acquirers and targets are available 
1,456 
The acquirers are selected based on the industry information provided in SIC 
codes which cover one of the three information technology industries as 
mentioned above 
1,328 
 
After imposing these aforementioned restrictions, the sample is reduced to 1,328 M&A deals. The 
period 1995-2015 is chosen to obtain annual R&D expenditure data for the five years period prior to the 
M&A event as the same methodology was employed in previous studies. The final panel for the 
regression analysis amounts to 16 years from 2000 to 2015 and includes 1,013 M&A deals.  
Figure 7. Yearly distribution of deals according to transaction value 
Source: Thomson One Banker 
Year # of Deals % of Total 
Total Deal  
Value ($mil) 
Average Deal  
Value ($mil) 
Median Deal 
Value ($mil) 
2000 121 11.94% $246,070.14 $2,033.64 $276.27 
2001 90 8.88% $55,089.68 $612.11 $83.79 
2002 61 6.02% $14,440.89 $236.74 $73.30 
2003 74 7.31% $29,230.82 $395.01 $85.40 
2004 54 5.33% $27,668.13 $512.37 $91.40 
2005 85 8.40% $41,881.64 $492.73 $138.74 
2006 78 7.70% $45,572.34 $584.26 $236.26 
2007 84 8.29% $88,445.27 $1,052.92 $216.29 
2008 59 5.82% $41,037.59 $695.55 $73.41 
2009 54 5.33% $42,726.70 $791.24 $115.04 
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Year # of Deals % of Total 
Total Deal  
Value ($mil) 
Average Deal  
Value ($mil) 
Median Deal 
Value ($mil) 
2010 49 4.84% $20,671.53 $421.87 $184.32 
2011 32 3.16% $17,223.67 $538.24 $57.98 
2012 49 4.84% $27,510.84 $561.45 $171.81 
2013 39 3.85% $25,529.14 $654.59 $180.00 
2014 36 3.55% $37,310.10 $1,036.39 $370.77 
2015 48 4.74% $119,790.99 $2,548.74 $398.76 
Total 1013 100.00% $880,199.46 $13,167.84 $2,753.54 
 
Robustness Checks 
There is little correlation between the main control variables, with the expected exception of relatedness 
among SIC codes. Although no statistically significant correlation is observed, there is a high negative 
relationship between percentage change in R&D-intensity and liquidity, as well as a high positive 
correlation between percentage change in R&D-intensity and profitability. However, no highly significant 
correlation (r>0.7 or r<-0.7) is observed which implies that the problem of multicollinearity should not 
be a concern with this sample.  
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